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(]nderinvestment in College Education?
This chapter adds several dimensions to the evaluation of the effects
of college education on earnings and productivity by comparing pri-
vate and social gains from college education with those from other
investments. These comparisons permit a determination of how much
is gained or lost by individuals and society from investing in the for-
mer rather than the latter, and are essential to determine whether
there is underinvestment in college education; they also help deter-
mine whether the capital market difficulties, the lack of knowledge
and liquidity, etc., outlined in Chapter III (see section 2) have been
serious impediments to the flow of resources into college education.
1. Private Money Gains
In discussing whether the private gain from college exceeds that on
other investments, a distinction must be made between the typical
college graduate and the typical high-school graduate. Chapter IV
indicated that the former gains more from college than the latter
would, that he comes from a much higher socioeconomic background
(see Table 5), and that he very likely finances his education with
resources that would otherwise (in part at least) have been invested
elsewhere, while the latter often would have to borrow, live frugally192 UNDERINVESTMENT IN COLLEGE EDUCATION?
as a student, or work overtime (after school). For the sake of brevity,
the discussion is limited to white male graduates. although interesting
comparisons could be made with dropouts, nonwhites, and women.
The private rate of return after adjusting for differential "ability"
seems to be more than 12 per cent to the cohort of white male college
graduates. When comparing the rate on college with rates that would
have been obtained if the resources spent on college had been invested
elsewhere, there has been a rather surprising tendency to select rates
on liquid investments bearing little risk, such as government bonds
or savings accounts.' The discussion has just indicated (Chapter IV,
section 4), however, that an investment in college education is subject
to considerable risk, and is obviously extremely illiquid. Consequently,
the gain from education should be compared with that on investments
with equally large risk and illiquidity.
The earlier analysis indicated that the variation in the rate of return
from corporate manufacturing investments is of the same general order
of magnitude as that from college education. Stigler estimated the
average rate of return on the former at a little over 7 per cent,2 several
percentage points higher than that on riskiess assets, but still much
lower than the 12+ per cent received by white male college graduates.
Although this difference of some 5 percentage points might be ex-
plained by compensating differences in liquidity and taxation,3 a more
reasonable inference would be that the private money gain from col-
lege to the typical white male graduate is greater than what could have
been obtained by investing elsewhere.
An estimate of the money gain could be found by discounting the
adjusted income differentials between college and high-school gradu-
ates at a rate measuring alternative opportunities. If the 4 per cent
riskiess rate were used, the present value4 of the gain to the 1949
cohort of white males would be more than $30,000; the more appro.
iSee p. C. Gljck and H. P. Miller, "Educational Level and Potential Income,"
American Sociological Review, June 1956, p. 310; and J. Morgan and M. H. David,
"Education and Income," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1963, p. 435.
2 C. J. Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries, Princeton
for NEER, 1963, Table 10.
For each year from 1938 to 1957, a rate of return was defined for all corporate
manufacturing firms as the ratio of after-tax profits to total capital. The simple
average of these ratios equals about 7percent both during 1938—1947 and 1947—1957.
3 Investors in firms could sometimes avoid the high personal income tax by con-
verting ordinary income into capital gains; investors in education cannot. The fact
that depreciation on physical capital can be explicitly deducted from taxable income
while that on education cannot, at first glance, also seems to favor investment in
firms. A closer look, however, raises some serious doubts (see Chapter II, section 1,
and Chapter VII, section 2).
4 By °present value" is meant the value at the time of entrance into college.PRIVATE MONEY GAINS 193
priate rate of 6 per cent would cut the gain to under $20,000, and the
possibly still more appropriate rate of 10 per cent would cut it to
under $4000. Although all these estimates are very much under the
$100,000 figure often bandied about,5 they are not insignificant. For
example, even if the gain were "only" $3500 (a 10 per cent rate), aver-
age tuition and fees in 1949 could have been raised by more than 300
per cent without wiping it out.6
The typical high-school graduate is another story. Instead of more
than 12 per cent, he would receive 10 to 11 per cent if he went to
college. Moreover, instead of investing resources that could have been
invested elsewhere he would have to finance much of his college edu-
cation by borrowing from friends or relatives,7 by living frugally, or
by working after school and during vacations. Since households regu-
larly pay from 8 to 18 per cent on bank and instalment credit loans
and even more on others, the cost of borrowing and/or the preference
for present consumption must be considered substantial. Consequently,
even an 11 per cent rate of return from college would not bulk very
large, especially when itis recognized that liquidity considerations
would be important here because these persons presumably have a
limited command of liquid assets.8
So while a college education seems to yield a net money gain to the
typical white male college graduate, it may not to the typical white
male high-school graduate. One should note, however, that the rapid
growth in recent years of low-interest student loans subsidized by state
and federal governments9 certainly must increase the attractiveness of
a college education. A study of -the demand for these loans should
shed considerable light on the conclusions reached here, and especially
5 Derived by Click and Miller, American Sociological Review, June 1956. For a
critical comment on their estimate, see H. 0. Houthakker, "Education and Income.'
Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1959, pp. 27—28.
6 Tuition and fees are estimated at $250 per student per year in 1949 (see Ap-
pendix A, section 2b). They could have been raised to over $1000 without wiping
out the gain.
7Orin recent years from governments. See later discussion.
8 Thus, according to one study, lack of money is the major reason given for not
going to college by high-school seniors from lower-income families, while itis a
relatively minor reason given by seniors from higher-income families (see Educa-
tional Status, College Plans, and Occupational Status of Farm and Non farm Youths:
October 1959, U.S. Bureau of Census, Series ERS (P.27), No. 30, Washington, 1961,
Table D).
9Asof September 1965, New York State alone had more than $72 million out-
standing in loans (see The New York Times, September 22, l96S). By mid.1960 the
National Defense Student Loan Fund amounted to almost $80 million (see A. Rivlin,
The Role of the Federal Government in Financing Higher Education, Washington,
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on the capital market impediments to investment in college educa-
tion.10
2. Social Productivity Gains
The social economic gain from education, the gain to society as op.
posed to individuals, could differ from the private gain because of
differences between social and private costs and returns. Economists
(and others) have generally had little success in estimating the social
effects of different investments, and, unfortunately, education is no
exception. One can, however, develop some lower and upper limits
that effectively rule out many of the more fanciful assertions about
the effects of education.
Total social as well as private costs would be the sum of direct and•
indirect costs. Direct costs are clearly greater to society than to stu-
dents because some of the expenditures on students are paid out of
public and private subsidies. Obviously, "free" state and municipal
colleges use scarce resources and are not free to society. Indirect costs,
on the other hand, would be greater to society only if the output of
students foregone by society exceeded the earnings foregone by
dents, which is not so obviously true.
Direct social costs would be the sum of educational expenditures by
colleges and the social cost of books and additional living expenses.
While the latter can be approximated by their private cost, an esti-
mate of educational expenditures is not obtained as easily since col.
leges spend money on athletic competitions, room and board, adult
education, research, medical care, etc., as well as on education proper.
In other words, they are multiproduct "firms" with a total expendi-
ture much greater than that on the single product education. I have
tried to approximate educational expenditures by eliminating expend-
itures on "noneducational activities," extension services, research, and
"specialized instruction" from the total.11
Although social costs should obviously include capital as well as
current costs, the fraction of educational expenditures paid by fees
10 Although bearing low-interest rates, these loans are not "easy" in all respects; in
particular, they usually require repayment within a much shorter period of time
than it takes to collect the payoff from a college education (on the payoff period, see
section 4 of Chapter IV).
11 For definitions of these terms, see "Statistics of Higher Education, 1955—56,"
Biennial Survey of Education in the United States, 1954—1956, Washington, 1959,
Chapter 4, section II, pp. 58—80.Fora further discussion, see Appendix A, this vol-
ume, section 2c.
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has usually been overestimated because only current expenditures have
been considered. Since educational institutions are quite capital-inten-
sive, expenditures are substantially raised and the fraction attributed
to fees lowered when physical capital is included. For example, in
1950 the use value of capital in colleges was about 26 per cent of
current expenditures, so that although fees were 42 per cent of cur-
rent expenditures, they were only about 33 per cent of all expendi-
tures. The full private contribution to all social costs has, however,
been greatly underestimated because indirect costs are generally ig-
nored, and they are mostly a private cost. If, for example, foregone
earnings were used to represent indirect social costs, college students
would be paying through tuition, fees, and foregone earnings almost
three-quarters of all social costs.
Social and private economic returns from college would differ if a
college education had different effects on earnings and productivity.
A student generally must only determine the effect of a college edu-
cation on his earnings, but society needs to determine its effect on
national income. Thus if college graduates earn more partly because
their productivity was systematically overestimated, private returns
would tend to be larger than social ones. A more common criticism,
however, is that earnings greatly understate the social productivity
of college graduates (and other educated persons) because they are
(allegedly) only partly compensated for their effect on the development
and spread of economic knowledge. In technical language, social re-
turns are said to be larger than private returns because of the external
economies produced by college graduates.
As a first approximation, social returns will be measured by the
before-tax earnings differentials, tax payments. being one kind of exter-
nal economy, and indirect social costs will be measured by the before-
tax earnings foregone. The social rate of return, unadjusted for
differential ability, would then be about 13 per cent to the 1939 cohort
of urban, native white, male college graduates and 12.5 per cent to
the 1949 cohort of white male college graduates. These are only
slightly less than the private rates because differential tax payments
almost offset the subsidies to college education. Similar results would
be found for dropouts and for nonwhite, female, and rural college
graduates.'2 Adjustments for IQ grades, and other ability factors
would have about the same effect on the social rates as they did on
the private rates: relatively little for the typical college person, and
12Forexample, social rates of return to the cohorts of urban, native white
male dropouts and urban, Southern nonwhite male graduates arc estimated at 8.5
and11 per cent, respectively, compared with private rates of 9 and 11.9 per cent.196 UNDERINVESTMENT IN COLLEGE EDUCATION?
a few percentage points for the typical high-school graduate (if he had
gone to college).
The development of a more sophisticated estimate of the social
gain is not easy because other external effects are very difficult to
measure. The absence of any direct measurements forced me to use an
indirect and not very reliable method. E. Denison estimated the con-
tribution of physical capital, labor, increasing returns, and many other
factors to economic growth in the United States. After deducting these
contributions, a residual is left over that he calls the contribution of
"advancement in knowledge."By attributing all of the residual to
education,14 an upper limit to the social effect of education can be
developed.'5
According to Denison, about .58 percentage points of the 1.60 per
cent average annual growth from 1929 to 1957 in national income per
person employed is explained by the growth in knowledge,'6 and
about .67 percentage points by the growth in education.'7 If the
growth in knowledge was considered an indirect effect of the growth
in education, the share attributed to education would almost double.
This in turn implies that the estimated average rate of return on
education would also almost double.13
If the contribution of different educational levels to the advance
in knowledge were proportionate to their direct effects on earnings—
possibly college graduates had a disproportionately large contribu-
13 See his Sources of Economic Growth in the United States, New York, 1962.
14 S. C. Strumilin, in an interpretation of economic growth in the Soviet Union,
does consider the "residual" to be a "social" effect of education (see his "The Eco-
nomics of Education in the U.S.S.R.," International Social Science Journal, 1962,
No. 4, P. 642).
15 Although a likely upper limit, it is not a necessary one because larger external
economies from education might have been nullified by net external diseconomies
from other sources.
16 Sources of Economic Growth, Table 33. The amount (residual) attributed to
knowledge would be different if different assumptions had been made about the
importance of economies of scale, restrictions against the optimal use of resources,
etc. For example, if all the increase in output per unit of input resulted from
advances in knowledge, the contribution of such advances would rise to .93 per-
centage points.
17 Ibid. The contribution of education is based on before-tax earning differentials
liberally adjusted for ability (ibid., Chap. 7).
18 The increase in income attributable to an increase in education can be written as:
y =itkI, where y is the percentage increase in income, k is the effect on income
of investing a dollar in education, and I is the fraction of income invested in educa-
tion. If the effect of a given investment in education were to double, y and thus it
would double. But since rk, where r is the rate of return, a doubling of it would
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tion—the unadjusted social rate of return to white male graduates
wOuld be estimated at close to 25 per cent. The initial estimate of the
social rate, 13 per cent, and the 25 per cent provide a lower and an
admittedly rough upper limit to the true rate, the difference between
them measuring the ignorance of external effects. Although this differ-
ence is embarrassingly large, it does suggest that, contrary to many
assertions, the private economic gain from education is much of the
social economic gain. For the private gain is more than half of the
apparent upper limit, and presumably a good deal more than half of
the true social rate.
In recent years the federal government has been subsidizing invest-
ment in education through scholarships and loans,19 and investment
in business capital throu.gh accelerated depreciation, tax credits, and
other means. Somehow the limited funds available must be allocated
between these different kinds of investment. One determinant clearly
should be, and hopefully is, their relative contribution to national
income, a topic that will now be discussed briefly.
A first approximation to the social rate of return on business capital
can be found by relating profits to capital, with profits including the
corporate income and other direct taxes.2° The before-tax rate of
return on corporate manufacturing capital averaged about 12 per
cent for both 1938—1947 and 1947_1957,21 compared to an after,tax rate
of 7 per cent. If the before-tax rate on all corporations were between 10
and 13 per cent and that on unincorporated firms between 4 and 8
per cent, almost the same as the after.tax rate on corporations, the
rate on all business capital would be between 8 and 12 per cent.22
The first approximation to the social rate of return to white male
college graduates would be between 10 and 13 per cent after adjust-
ment for differential ability. Since the rates to dropouts, women, and
nonwhites would be a few percentage points lower, the rate to all
college entrants would be between 8 and 11 per cent. The rates on
business capital and college education seem, therefore, to fall within
the same range.
A fuller treatment of external effects could, however, change the
picture entirely. It has been seen that if all the unexplained residual
SeeRivlin, Role of Federal Government, Chapters 4 and 5.
20 This method assumes only that direct taxes come initially out of the return on
capital; it is consistent with any kind of ultimate incidence.
21 Computed by adding the tax payments of corporate manufacturing firms to
Stigler's after-tax profits.
22 About 80 per cent of all tangible business capital seems to be in corporations
(computed from Vol. II of Studies in the National Balance Sheet of the United States
by R. Goldsmith, R. Lipsey, and M. Mendelson, Princeton for NBER, 1963).198 UNDERIN VESTMENT IN COLLEGE EDUCATION?
for 1929—1957 were attributed to education, its estimated social rate
would almost double; if, on the other hand, all was attributed to
business capital,its estimated social rate would much more than
double.23 Consequently, depending on the allocation of the residual,
that is, the "advance in knowledge," the estimated social rate on col-
lege education could be as much as twice and as little as less than half
of that on business capital. Ignorance about the "residual," therefore,
precludes at present any firm judgment about the relative social rates
on business capital and college education.
3. Private Real Rates
A treatment of the full, as opposed to the economic, social rate of
return on college education would involve a consideration of cultural
advance, democratic government, etc., and is clearly far beyond the
scope of this study. Even a treatment of the full private rate is ex-
ceedingly difficult and I shall be content simply to raise some ques-
tions and suggest a few very tentative answers.
In deciding whether to go to college, attitudes toward college life
and studying, the kind of work college graduates do, and other psychic
factors are relevant as well as the gain in earnings. Full or real re-
turns and costs would be the sum of monetary and psychic ones, and
the real gain would depend on the relation between these real returns
and costs. The psychic gain from college, like the monetary gain,
probably differs considerably between the typical college and high-
school graduate. For presumably the former does and the latter does
not go to college partly because. of a difference in expected psychic
gains.24 Or to use more direct evidence, lack of interest is usually a
major reason cited by high-school seniors in explaining why they were
not going to college, and by college dropouts in explaining why they
never finished.25
Quantitative estimates of psychic gains are never direcily available
and are usually computed residually as the difference between inde-
23 The effect on the business rate is much greater than that on education because
the estimated direct contribution of business capital to growth is much less than that
of education (see Denison, Sources of Economic Growth, Table 33).
24 For a similar argument applied to monetary gains, see section 2 of Chapter IV.
25 See Educational Status, College Plans, and Occupational Status of Farm and
Nonf arm Youths: October 1959, Tables D, and 12—16; also E. Roper, Factors Affecting
the Admission of High School Seniors to College, Washington, 1949.PRIVATE REAL RATES 199
pendent estimates of monetary and real gains.26 Unfortunately, inde-
pendent estimates of the real gains to college graduates are not
available. For example, they could not be measured by the monetary
gains from other capital because there may also be psychic gains from
such capital,27 and, more importantly, because the real gains from
college and other capital may differ owing to differences in access to
the capital market or to other factors. One can use actual behavior
to test whether real gains do differ. For if, say, college education were
an unusually attractive investment, pressure would develop to invest
more there, and while it could be offset in the short run by financing
and other difficulties, these could be at least partially surmounted in
the long run.
TABLE 12
Investment in College Education Relative
to Physical Capital for Selected Years
Ratio of Investment










Source: The numerators from T. W. Schultz "Capital
Formation by Education," Journal of Political Economy,
December 1960, Table 6; the denominators from Simon
Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and
Financing, Princeton forNBER, 1961, Table R-4, p.490.
Table 12 indicates that the gross investment in college education
rose from about 2.5 per cent of that in physical capital in 1920 to
about 8 per cent in 1940 and 12 per cent in 1956. Foregone earnings,
26 See, for example, the estimates of "tastes for discrimination" in my Economics
of Discrimination, Chapters 7 and 8.
27 For example, Marshall alleged that much of the value of land in Great Britain
resulted from the prestige attached to ownership (see his unpublished lecture,
"Progress and Poverty," delivered March 6, 1883, and recently mimeographed by
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which are a rough measure of private investment, rose no less rapidly.28
So the private real rate of return has apparently been higher on
college education than on physical capital. Since the money rate has
probably also been higher (see section 1), the evidence on real rates
does not necessarily mean that the psychic rate has been higher on
college education than on physical capital, but only that it could not
have been much lower.
28 Of course, gross investment in education may have risen faster because the cost
rather than the quantity of education rose faster. Unfortunately, no one has devel-
oped a good measure of the quantity of education; the most reasonable available
measure isthe number of persons receiving a college education. Since 1940 the
number of college graduates in the labor force has much more than doubled while
the real value of the capital stock has increased by less than 70 per cent (see my
Table 16 and Denison, op. cit., Table 12).